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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 THE TREATY ON Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) has  provided for the creation of an inter-parliamentary conference in order to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by that treaty. 1 Fiscal 
and economic policy coordination in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
has become much more intense and takes place between the European Commis-
sion and national governments in the Council. The pressure put on Member States 
is based on a stronger legal framework, composed of the  ‘ six-pack ’ , the TSCG and 
the  ‘ two-pack ’ , 2 and is visible in the functioning of the  ‘ European Semester ’ . 3 In this 
framework, parliamentary scrutiny of budgetary policies by individual national 
parliaments and by the European Parliament (EP) is limited. 4 
 To address this state of affairs, increasing pressures have mounted to strengthen 
cooperation between the EP and national parliaments. According to many, inter-
parliamentary cooperation and scrutiny could compensate national parliaments 
for the transfer of power from the national to the European level and for the transfer 
of power from national parliaments to their governments with respect to fi scal 
 *  I would like to thank Federico Fabbrini, the participants of the conference at Tilburg University in 
June 2014, and Christian Deubner for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
 1  See Art 13 TSCG. 
 2  For a detailed account, see  P  Craig ,  ‘ Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis :  Constitutional 
Architecture and Constitutional Implications ’ in  M  Adams ,  F  Fabbrini and  P  Larouche (eds),  The 
 Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints ( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2014 ) . 
 3  The European Semester is foreseen by  Art 2(a) Regulation  1466/97 amended by Regulation 
 1175 / 2011 . 
 4  See  D  Chalmers ,  ‘ The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle ’ ( 2012 ) 
 18  European Law Journal  667, 693 (stating that a  ‘ zone of infl uence dominated by the Commission 
and ECOFIN is established, with political confl icts taking place within these, but the atrophying of 
local democracy leads to a hollowing out of domestic processes so that these become little more than 
adminis trative containers ’ .) 
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and economic policy. 5 It could also allow the EP to exert infl uence in an area 
with little legislative activity and an only marginal role of the EP. However, inter-
parliamentary cooperation in the area of economic and fi nancial governance has 
met several challenges and has so far moved forward slowly. 
 The challenges of inter-parliamentary cooperation in economic and fi nan-
cial governance refl ect those that have been encountered in foreign and security 
 policy, 6 but might be even more diffi cult to resolve, because the general relation-
ship between the two parliamentary levels is still characterised by confl ict, rather 
than cooperation. 7 But the executive dominance in fi scal and economic policy 
coordination could put pressure on national parliaments and the EP to work 
together against their declining infl uence and  ‘ exert countervailing power, both 
individually and collectively ’ . 8 This chapter puts forward the idea that the purpose 
of a  joint scrutiny inter-parliamentary cooperation should be to  ‘ discuss ’ matters 
of common interest and to  ‘ control ’ in areas with weak parliamentary scrutiny. 
However, inter-parliamentary settings should  not  ‘ decide ’ , because assigning 
 decision-making power to an inter-parliamentary conference would signifi cantly 
alter the EU inter-institutional equilibrium. 
 The chapter is structured as follows: Section II describes inter-parliamentary 
cooperation as it is defi ned in the treaties and by inter-parliamentary practices. 
Although the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and members of 
national parliaments (MPs) meet regularly in organised settings, the meaning of 
inter-parliamentary cooperation is ill-defi ned and two contradictory concepts 
co-exist: Inter-parliamentary cooperation as ‘ centralised scrutiny ’ dominated by the 
EP, with only very limited input by national parliaments; and inter-parliamentary 
cooperation as  ‘ joint scrutiny ’ by national parliaments and the EP. 9 Section III 
examines the concept of centralised scrutiny defended by the EP that aims at 
keeping inter-parliamentary cooperation weak. Section IV reviews the idea of joint 
scrutiny endorsed by many national parliaments, although not the national parlia-
ments of all 28 Member States. 10 Here, the cases of the parliaments of Denmark, 
 5  See, eg  C  Deubner ,  ‘ St ä rkere Parlamente in der neuen WWU-Gouvernanz ? ’ ( 2014 )  37  integration 
 21, 44 ;  A  Maurer ,  From EMU to DEMU:  The Democratic Legitimacy of the EU and the European Parlia-
ment ( Rome ,  Istituto affari internazionali ,  2013 )  14 ;  W  Wessels , et al,  Democratic Control in the Member 
States of the European Council and the Euro Zone Summits ( European Parliament ,  2012 )  29 . 
 6  A  Herranz-Surrall é s ,  ‘ The EU ’ s Multilevel Parliamentary (Battle)Field :  Inter-parliamentary 
 Cooperation and Confl ict in Foreign and Security Policy ’ ( 2014 )  37  West European Politics  957 . 
 7  K  Neunreither ,  ‘ The European Parliament and National Parliaments :  Confl ict or Cooperation ? ’ 
( 2005 )  11  Journal of Legislative Studies  466 . 
 8  D  Curtin ,  ‘ Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy ’ ( 2014 )  77  Modern Law 
Review  1, 30 . 
 9  I  Cooper ,  ‘ Parliamentary Oversight of the EU after the Crisis: On the Creation of the  “ Article 13 ” 
Interparliamentary Conference ’ ( LUISS School of Government Working Papers ,  2014 )  2 . 
 10  For the preferences of national parliaments and European institutions on Article 13 TSCG and its 
implementation, ibid. with the most recent account;  C  Deubner ,  The Diffi cult Role of Parliaments in the 
Reformed Governance of the Economic and Monetary Union ( Brussels ,  Foundation of European Progres-
sive Studies ,  2013 ) ;  V  Kreilinger ,  The New Inter-parliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial 
Governance ( Notre Europe — Jacques Delors Institute ,  2013 ) ; and Maurer,  From EMU to DEMU (n 5). 
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France, Germany and Lithuania are analysed in more detail. Strong  ‘ joint scrutiny ’ 
mechanisms are, for example, backed by the French Parliament, while the German 
Parliament prefers a weaker form of  ‘ joint scrutiny ’ . This allows classifying parlia-
ments according to three roles as  inward-looking ,  passively cooperative or  actively 
networking with respect to inter-parliamentary cooperation . Section V, fi nally, 
gives a summary of the fi ndings of this chapter and an assessment of the prospects 
for inter-parliamentary cooperation in economic and fi nancial governance. 
 II. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE TREATIES AND IN PRACTICE 
 According to Article 12 TEU national parliaments  ‘ contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union  … by taking part in the inter-parliamentary  cooperation 
between national Parliaments and with the European Parliament ’ . 11 The precise 
legal basis for inter-parliamentary cooperation can be found in Protocol No 1 
on the Role of National Parliaments annexed to the EU treaties:  ‘ the organisa-
tion and promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation 
within the Union shall be determined by the European Parliament and National 
 Parliaments ’ . 12 Article 10 of Protocol No 1 specifi es that a 
 conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs  … shall  … promote the 
exchange of information and best practice between National Parliaments and the 
 European Parliament, including their special committees. It may also organise inter-
parliamentary conferences on specifi c topics  … Contributions from the conference shall 
not bind National Parliaments and shall not prejudge their positions. 13 
 This provision of the Protocol recognises the Conference of Parliamentary 
Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the EU (COSAC) which was 
established in 1989. Based on the COSAC model two new policy-specifi c 
inter-parliamentary conferences were created recently. On the one hand, the 
Inter-parliamentary Conference on Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) substituted the Assembly of the 
West European Union (WEU) in 2012. On the other hand, the need for better 
cooperation between national parliaments and the EP with respect to the EMU 
was acknowledged by the TSCG, 14 and it prompted the creation of an inter-
parliamentary conference which had its fi rst meeting in October 2013. 
 Article 13 TSCG is the product of the intergovernmental negotiations and has 
undergone signifi cant changes during the negotiating process, revealing the dif-
fi culties met by the Member States in reaching an agreement on this point. The 
original objective of the treaty article was that national MPs meet regularly and 
 11  Art 12 TEU. 
 12  Art 9, Protocol No 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the 
European Union Treaties. 
 13  ibid Art 10. 
 14  See above (n 1). 
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that this would happen in close association with the EP. Article 13 was completely 
revised twice and only the later drafts of the treaty drew a link to the existing 
inter-parliamentary structures. 15 Member States may have included the article in 
the treaty in order to facilitate the national ratifi cation processes of the TSCG. The 
fi nal wording of Article 13 agreed by the Contracting Parties is the following: 
 As provided for in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of national Parliaments in 
the European Union annexed to the European Union Treaties, the European Parlia-
ment and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will together determine 
the  organisation and promotion of a conference of representatives of the relevant 
 committees of the European Parliament and representatives of the relevant committees 
of national  Parliaments in order to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered 
by this Treaty. 16 
 In the national ratifi cation processes of the TSCG and in discussions about how to 
achieve a  ‘ genuine EMU ’ the question of the implementation of Article 13 TSCG 
emerged on the agenda and parliaments started to address the issue. Both chairper-
sons of European Affairs Committees and Speakers of Parliaments held informal 
ad hoc meetings in sub-groups and tried to coordinate their positions. After 
many actors had articulated their preferences, sometimes both individually and 
collectively, it was the  ‘ Speakers ’ Conference ’ in April 2013 (the annual meeting 
of the Speakers of all EU parliaments) that agreed on a compromise about the 
organisation of the inter-parliamentary conference. 17 Thus the conclusions of the 
Speakers ’ Conference provided the basis for bringing Article 13 TSCG into prac-
tice in October 2013. Since then the inter-parliamentary conference has discussed 
whether it should adopt Rules of Procedure and possible provisions to be included 
into them: the Parliament of Lithuania presented a draft 18 which was not endorsed 
by the conference, the following Presidency (Greece) asked all parliaments for 
input, and at the September 2014 meeting (organised by the Italian Parliament) 
the internal organisation was an item on the agenda and discussed at the inter-
parliamentary conference, but no agreement was reached and further discussions 
were postponed until 2015. 
 Many analysts have assessed inter-parliamentary cooperation as benefi cial, 
both from a rationalist and a normative perspective: inter-parliamentary coopera-
tion could reduce informational asymmetries, favour the exchange of specialised 
knowledge, facilitate policy formulation, and foster mutual understanding and a 
 15  For a detailed discussion of the drafting of the TSCG, see  V  Kreilinger ,  The Making of a New 
Treaty:  Six Rounds of Political Bargaining ( Notre Europe — Jacques Delors Institute ,  2012 ) . 
 16  See above (n 1). 
 17  Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments,  ‘ Presidency Conclusions — Nicosia, 
21 – 23 April 2014 ’ available at:  www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/fi les/download/082dbcc53dbcb6ed
013e3b68418b5327.do . For an analysis of the compromise, see Kreilinger,  The Making of a New Treaty 
(n 15) 14. 
 18  Parliament of Lithuania,  ‘ Draft Rules of Procedure of the Interparliamentary Conference on 
 Economic and Financial Governance of the European Union ’ , 2013. 
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transnational public debate. 19 Inter-parliamentary cooperation could not only 
contribute to reducing the democratic defi cit by giving a collective voice to parlia-
ments, but the exchange of information and best practices for individual scrutiny 
could also lead to stronger parliamentary control of national governments and EU 
institutions. This would strengthen both elements of the dual legitimacy on which 
the political system of the EU relies — the democratic institutions of the Member 
States and the directly elected EP. 20 However, the TSCG and the Treaty establishing 
a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) do  ‘ little or nothing to anchor new regula-
tory functions for the Union in democratic institutions ’ . 21 
 At the same time,  ‘ the intergovernmental logic brings with it an inter-
parliamentary balancing ’ : 22 the main theoretical rationale behind resorting to 
inter-parliamentary cooperation in economic and fi nancial governance lies in 
the use of intergovernmental legal instruments in that area. More far-reaching 
concepts for multi-level parliamentarism insist that:  ‘ The dominance of the 
member state governments in the European Council needs to be balanced with 
an equally strong voice of parliamentary representation. ’ 23 If Member States had 
not resorted to the intergovernmental or to the  ‘ Union method ’ , 24 economic and 
fi nancial affairs would be governed by the Community method and the EP would 
be entirely responsible for democratic control. 25 
 In practice, there are some challenges for inter-parliamentary cooperation. 26 
The participation rates of national parliaments in such conferences illustrate the 
ambiguous interest of MPs in European affairs: COSAC meetings from 2009 to 
2013 show a considerable variation across EU Member States and this assess-
ment was confi rmed for the inter-parliamentary conference on economic and 
 19  See especially, Herranz-Surrall é s,  ‘ The EU ’ s Multilevel Parliamentary (Battle)Field ’ (n 6) 2; 
 A  Benz,  ‘ Linking Multiple Demoi :  Inter-parliamentary Relations in the EU ’ ( 2011 )  12  Hagener 
Online-Beitr ä ge zu den Europ ä ischen Verfassungswissenschaften  11 ;  C  Kraft-Kasack ,  ‘ Transnational 
Parliamentary Assemblies :  A Remedy for the Democratic Defi cit of International Governance ? ’ ( 2008 ) 
 31  West European Politics  534 ;  K  Neunreither ,  ‘ The Democratic Defi cit of the European Union :  Towards 
Closer Cooperation between the European Parliament and the National Parliaments ’ ( 1994 )  29 
Government and Opposition  299 . 
 20  See, eg Neunreither,  ‘ The Democratic Defi cit ’ (n 19). 
 21  M  Dawson and  F  de Witte ,  ‘ Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis ’ ( 2013 ) 
76  Modern Law Review  817, 834 . 
 22  S  Fabbrini ,  Intergovermentalism and its Outcomes: The Implications of the Euro Crisis on the 
European Union ( LUISS School of Government Working Papers Series ,  2013 )  12 . 
 23  J  Neyer ,  ‘ Justifi ed Multi-level Parliamentarism: Situating National Parliaments in the European 
Polity ’ ( 2014 )  20  Journal of Legislative Studies  125, 135 . 
 24  A Merkel, Speech at the opening ceremony of the 61st academic year of the College of Europe in 
Bruges on 2 November 2010. 
 25  On the Community method, see for a summary, eg  R  Dehousse ,  La m é thode communautaire, 
syst è me op é rationnel  “ par d é faut ”  de l ’ UE ( Notre Europe — Jacques Delors Institute ,  2013 ) . 
 26  O  Costa and  M  Latek  ‘ Paradoxes and Limits of Interparliamentary Cooperation in the 
European Union ’ ( 2001 )  23  Journal of European Integration  139 ;  T  Raunio ,  ‘ National Parliaments and 
European Integration :  What we know and Agenda for Future Research ’ ( 2009 )  15  Journal of Legislative 
Studies  317 . 
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 fi nancial governance. 27 Thus relations between national parliaments have so far 
 ‘ not develop[ed] into a balanced multilateral interplay including parliaments from 
all member states on the same footing ’ . 28 
 In addition to that, two different concepts of inter-parliamentary coopera-
tion coexist: the key question is whether there should be  centralised scrutiny or 
 joint scrutiny .  ‘ Centralised scrutiny ’ means that inter-parliamentary cooperation 
is dominated by the EP, with only very limited input by national parliaments; 
the competing concept is inter-parliamentary cooperation as  ‘ joint scrutiny ’ by 
national parliaments and the EP. 29 
 These different concepts refl ect disagreement about which functions an inter-
parliamentary conference should fulfi l. Disagreement typically centres on the 
actual purpose of inter-parliamentary cooperation: Should it decide ? Should it 
control ? Should it discuss ? Moreover, it concerns basic issues such as the formal 
weight to be given to the two parliamentary levels: should the EP delegation have 
as many seats as each of the national parliaments or should it have more ? 30 
 The underlying explanation of the profound disagreements between national 
parliaments and the EP is a mismatch between the daily EU policy-making 
and formal treaty powers which lead to  ‘ overlapping authority claims ’ : 31 an incre-
mental and informal empowerment of the EP, even in economic and fi nancial 
governance, clashes with national parliaments and their constitutional role linked 
to intergovernmental treaties and their domestic role in controlling national 
governments. This prevents sharing the scrutiny tasks between national parlia-
ments and the EP in EMU governance. 32 
 III. INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION AS  CENTRALISED SCRUTINY 
DOMINATED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 The EP has traditionally been sceptical about enhancing the role of national par-
liaments, fearing that this might undermine its position. 33 In an own-initiative 
report on a genuine EMU, the EP stated in November 2012 that only itself,  ‘ as 
parliamentary body at the Union level for a reinforced and democratic EMU 
 27  For data on COSAC: Kreilinger,  The New Inter-parliamentary Conference (n 10) 5. For data on the 
fi rst inter-parliamentary conference on economic and fi nancial governance,  V  Kreilinger ,  ‘ Possibilities 
for Upgrading Inter-parliamentary Cooperation after the 2014 European Elections ’ ( 2014 )  23  Polish 
Quarterly of International Affairs  57, 59 . 
 28  Benz,  ‘ Linking Multiple Demoi ’ (n 19) 11. 
 29  Cooper,  ‘ Parliamentary Oversight of the EU ’ (n 9) 2. 
 30  Kreilinger,  ‘ Possibilities for Upgrading Inter-parliamentary Cooperation ’ (n 27) 58. 
 31  Herranz-Surrall é s (n 6) 15. 
 32  See Deubner,  ‘ St ä rkere Parlamente in der neuen WWU-Gouvernanz ? ’ (n 5) 37. 
 33  See, eg  B  Crum and  JE  Fossum ,  ‘ Conclusion :  Towards a Democratic Multilevel Parliamentary 
Field ? ’ in  B  Crum and  JE  Fossum (eds),  Practices of Inter-parliamentary Coordination in International 
Politics the European Union and Beyond ( Colchester ,  ECPR Press ,  2013 )  255 . 
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 governance ’ , 34 had full democratic legitimacy to exercise control in that area. The 
report, drafted by Marianne Thyssen MEP, described the possibility of creating a 
mixed parliamentary body as  ‘ both ineffective and illegitimate ’ : 
 While reaffi rming its intention to intensify the cooperation with national parliaments 
on the basis of Protocol No 1, [it] stresses that such a cooperation should not be seen as 
the creation of a new mixed parliamentary body which would be both ineffective and 
illegitimate on a democratic and constitutional point of view; [it also] stresses the full 
legitimacy of the European Parliament, as parliamentary body at the Union level for a 
reinforced and democratic EMU governance. 35 
 In its blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU, also published in November 2012, 
the European Commission took a critical view on inter-parliamentary coopera-
tion, too, and echoed the Parliament ’ s view by stating: 
 The role of national parliaments will always remain crucial in ensuring legitimacy of 
Member States ’ action  … Cooperation between the European Parliament and national 
parliaments is also valuable: it builds up mutual understanding and common ownership 
for EMU as a multilevel governance system  … Inter-parliamentary cooperation as such 
does not, however, ensure democratic legitimacy for EU decisions. That requires a parlia-
mentary assembly representatively composed in which votes can be taken. The European 
Parliament, and only it, is that assembly for the EU and hence for the euro. 36 
 The EU supranational institutions thus reject the view that cooperation between 
the EP and national parliaments may provide democratic legitimacy for EMU-
related decisions. The fi nal report  ‘ towards a genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union ’ drafted by the President of the European Council puts the EP at the centre 
of ensuring democratic legitimacy and accountability. At the end of the process, 
the European Council conclusions of 13 – 14 December 2012 affi rm that:  ‘ The 
European Parliament and national parliaments will determine together the organ-
isation and promotion of a conference of their representatives to discuss EMU 
related issues. ’ 37 This is exactly the wording of Article 13 TSCG as it had emerged 
in January 2012. 38 
 The concept of inter-parliamentary cooperation as  centralised scrutiny domi-
nated by the EP has gained traction at the EU level. According to this reasoning 
 only the EP is able  ‘ to stress the points of convergence and the shared interests 
amongst the parliamentarians and citizens of different Member States, instead of 
aiming at achieving exclusively national interests ’ . 39 The President of the European 
 34  European Parliament, Report with recommendations to the Commission on the report of 
the Presidents of the European Council, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and 
the Eurogroup  ‘ Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union ’ ( 19 November 2012 , 
 2012/2151(INI)) 19 . 
 35  ibid. 
 36  European Commission,  ‘ A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union: 
Launching a European Debate ’ ,  28 November 2012 , COM ( 2012 ) 777 fi nal 35 . 
 37  European Council, Conclusions of 13 – 14 December ( 2012 ,  EUCO 205/12 ) . 
 38  See Kreilinger (n 15). 
 39  C Fasone,  ‘ The struggle of the European Parliament to participate in the new Economic 
Governance ’ EUI Working Paper RSCAS 45/2012, 18. 
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affairs committee of the French Senate stressed that the EP  ‘ has put pressure on 
other EU institutions to convince them that parliamentary oversight of the new 
governance is primarily ensured by itself  ’ . 40 During the negotiations on the set-up 
of the inter-parliamentary conference on economic and fi nancial governance, 
that are still not completed, the EP  ‘ pursues the sometimes contradictory goals of 
keeping the conference weak, but at the same time maintaining [or securing] a 
privileged position for itself in the new structure ’ . 41 
 In addition to that, in 2014 the EP has also considered a modifi cation of its 
own internal organisation in order to respond to the needs of fi scal and economic 
policy coordination: possible options that have been discussed with respect to the 
structure and modalities for euro area governance within the EP include addi-
tional resources for euro area scrutiny within the existing economic and monetary 
affairs committee or a new parliamentary structure (an  ‘ EMU subcommittee ’ ) 
entrusted with non-legislative scrutiny tasks. 42 
 IV. INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION AS  JOINT SCRUTINY BY THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
 A. The Argument for  Joint Scrutiny in Financial and Economic Governance 
 The fi rst report  ‘ towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union ’ in June 2012 
fl oated the idea of  ‘ joint [inter-parliamentary] decision-making ’ , 43 but the later 
reports lowered the level of ambition and only called for an increase in  ‘ the level of 
cooperation between national parliaments and the European Parliament ’ . 44 There 
are, however, many decisions concerning economic and fi scal policy coordina-
tion in the EU that are either taken in intergovernmental settings without proper 
control by parliament or build upon recommendations of the European Com-
mission in the context of the European Semester that restrict the policy options 
that are available in terms of the budgetary and economic policy choices at 
the national level. 45 Or, in other words,  ‘ the austerity drive, in particular through 
 40  Sé nat fran ç ais,  ‘ Compte rendu de la Commission des affaires europé ennes ’ (31 January 2013) 
available at:  www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20130128/europ.html . Translated by the author. 
 41  Cooper (n 9) 2. 
 42  S  Bowles ,  ‘ Structure and modalities within the Parliament for euro area governance in the 
next legislature, Letter to Martin Schulz ’ ( 2014 ) available at: sylvie-goulard.eu/articles2014/Annex-
3a-Chair-s-Announcements-ECON-structure.pdf . 
 43  European Council President,  ‘ Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union ’ ( 26 June 
2012 )  6 . 
 44  European Council President,  ‘ Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. Interim 
Report ’ ( 12 October 2012 )  8 . 
 45  See, eg Chalmers,  ‘ The European Redistributive State ’ (n 4);  R  Dehousse and  L  Boussaguet , 
 ‘ L ’ impact de la crise sur la gouvernance europ é enne ’ ( 2014 )  n ° 149 Pouvoirs 7 ;  FW  Scharpf ,  ‘ Monetary 
Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Pre-emption of Democracy ’ ( 2011 )  2  Zeitschrift f ü r Staats- und Europawis-
senschaften  163 . 
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the  obligations provided for under the European Semester  … sidelines national 
parliaments from the budgetary control that constitutes their most traditional and 
symbolic prerogative ’ . 46 
 When fi scal and economic policies have become more closely coordinated at 
the European level, but continue to be national  policies and not a common and 
single EU  policy , parliamentary control in the EMU can neither be exercised solely 
by the EP, nor individually by each national parliament holding its government 
accountable. Parliaments in the EU  ‘ are increasingly orientated to one another; 
each is becoming an intrinsic part of the others ’ operating environment ’ . 47 Thus 
 joint scrutiny by the EP and national parliaments has been voiced as a solution, 48 
because many experts fear that if the strongest national parliament(s) served as 
the benchmark for the individual scrutiny mechanisms to be adopted by other 
national parliaments,  ‘ the EMU might become altogether ungovernable ’ . 49 A feasi-
ble solution is deeply informed oversight in an inter-parliamentary conference —
 linked to the European Semester, to European Council meetings (and the Euro 
summits at their margins) and to key Euro group meetings — with an awareness 
of the functioning of economic and fi nancial governance and allowing for some 
room of manoeuvre for the executive(s). 50 Inter-parliamentary cooperation has 
the advantage of  combining both parliamentary levels. If the German Finance 
Minister acts at the EU level in the Eurogroup or the Board of the European Sta-
bility Mechanism, he will obviously be under scrutiny of the Bundestag, but there 
could also be hearings by an inter-parliamentary body which would include MPs 
from other national parliaments as well as MEPs. 
 Some decisions in the EMU are taken without proper parliamentary control 
at any level (this concerns the ESM, the Eurogroup, European Council meetings 
or euro area summits, and the European Central Bank), 51 even though the heads 
of all these bodies appear before the EP, either in plenary or in the economic and 
monetary affairs committee. 52 An inter-parliamentary arena, where MPs and 
MEPs meet regularly, as a place for discussion and as a meeting point between 
 46  Dawson and de Witte,  ‘ Constitutional Balance in the EU ’ (n 21) 827. 
 47  Crum and Fossum,  ‘ Conclusion ’ (n 33) 252. 
 48  Most recently the conclusions of the Speakers ’ Conference in Nicosia (April 2013) and the 
 working paper issued after a meeting of a sub-group of speakers in Luxembourg (January 2013) make 
proposals that follow the idea of  ‘ joint scrutiny ’ . 
 49  For a summary of this view, not shared by the author himself, see Deubner,  The Diffi cult Role of 
Parliaments (n 10) 35. 
 50  See  C  Hefftler et al,  National Parliaments: Their Emerging Control over the European Council 
( Notre Europe — Jacques Delors Institute ,  2013 )  12 . 
 51  The ESM treaty does not mention the EP and only mentions national parliaments in a commit-
ment to provide them with the annual report of its board of auditors in Art 30 ESM (Dawson and 
de Witte (n 21) 833). See also Wessels et al,  Democratic Control (n 5). For a more detailed account 
of the EMU institutional framework, see  A  De Streel ,  ‘ The Evolution of the EU Economic Govern-
ance since the Treaty of Maastricht :  An Unfi nished Task ’ ( 2013 )  20  Maastricht Journal of European and 
 Comparative Law  336, 353 . 
 52  Kreilinger (n 10) 14. 
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the democratically legitimised institutions of the EU level and the national level, 
could collectively fulfi l this control function, even though the EP is apparently 
situated in  ‘ a complex pattern of cooperation and competition with national 
parliaments ’ . 53 The possibilities at such a conference to discuss and to exchange 
best practices could also provide a remedy against the information asymmetry 
from which national parliaments suffer vis- à -vis their governments. 54 Such an 
inter-parliamentary conference, based on  joint scrutiny and covering economic 
and fi nancial governance  ‘ could gradually develop into an arena for political com-
petition where battles are fought about the direction of the Union ’ s economic 
policy ’ . 55 Instead of separate and disconnected debates on economic policy, the 
inter-parliamentary conference could help to constitute a transnational debate 
and promote transnational interests, although in the case of other transnational 
assemblies their contribution to the democratic legitimation of decision-making 
beyond the state is only marginal. 56 
 B. Ideal Types of Positions Towards Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation 
 National parliaments have consciously adopted different positions towards inter-
parliamentary cooperation. Resulting from their institutional self-interest, they 
generally prefer  joint scrutiny to  centralised scrutiny , but their preferences for the 
precise organisation of this kind of inter-parliamentary cooperation differ. On 
the basis of different levels of activity, this chapter proposes to classify the atti-
tudes of national parliaments towards inter-parliamentary cooperation into three 
different roles: 57  (1) inward-looking parliaments that rarely engage beyond the 
minimum requirements;  (2) passively cooperative parliaments that participate in 
additional activities aimed at discussing inter-parliamentary cooperation; and  (3) 
actively networking parliaments that try to build coalitions in order to bring inter-
parliamentary cooperation forward. 
 53  Crum and Fossum,  Conclusion (n 33) 253. See also the previous Section III of this chapter for 
the EP. 
 54  Curtin,  ‘ Challenging Executive Dominance ’ (n 8) 29. See also Neunreither,  ‘ The European Parlia-
ment and National Parliaments ’ (n 7). 
 55  Kreilinger (n 10) 23. 
 56  Kraft-Kasack,  ‘ Transnational Parliamentary Assemblies ’ (n 19) 552. 
 57  These roles do not substitute other classifi cations of parliamentary involvement in EU affairs. 
The roles are rooted in national parliamentary practices in each Member State and based on diver-
gent visions of what function(s) a legislature should perform. This classifi cation has been inspired by 
classifi cations for national parliaments in other domains, namely  O  Rozenberg and  C  Hefftler ,  ‘ Intro-
duction ’ in  Claudia  Hefftler et al (eds),  Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union 
( Basingstoke ,  Palgrave Macmillan ,  2015 ) and  C  Sprungk ,  ‘ A New Type of Representative Democracy ? 
Reconsidering the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union ’ ( 2013 )  35  Journal of European 
Integration  547 , but the classifi cation put forward in this chapter uses different categories and different 
distinctive features. 
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 The three roles of national parliaments in inter-parliamentary cooperation are 
defi ned as follows: 
 (1)  Inward-looking parliaments rarely engage in inter-parliamentary coop-
eration beyond the minimum requirements. 58 They put their priorities on 
the domestic arena. Such parliaments could be seen as  ‘ gatekeepers ’ 59 that 
have the objective, for example, to prevent legislation at the national level 
rather than shape it at the European level or see themselves as a national 
 ‘ public forum ’ . 60 They are not Europeanised in their attitude towards inter-
parliamentary cooperation, but can be Europeanised in other activities 
related to EU affairs. 
 (2)  Passively cooperative parliaments that participate in additional activities 
aimed at discussing inter-parliamentary cooperation dedicate some addi-
tional resources to cooperation with their fellow parliaments, but do not try 
to set the agenda. Only when it is necessary, do they articulate their prefer-
ences on the precise organisation of inter-parliamentary cooperation. They 
send delegations to inter-parliamentary conferences comprising MPs that 
represent government and opposition parties and both chambers, if appli-
cable. These parliaments are Europeanised as passive  ‘ European players ’ , 61 so 
they could belong to this ideal type for general parliamentary involvement, 
but need not. Compared with parliaments that are inward-looking, they 
better understand the negotiation situation at the EU level. 
 (3)  Actively networking parliaments try to build coalitions in order to infl uence 
the organisation of inter-parliamentary cooperation and have a network 
 ‘ beyond their own domestic parliamentary arena ’ . 62 Such a parliament orga-
nises extraordinary meetings with like-minded parliaments; it performs a 
 ‘ networking role ’ 63 with other parliaments (as well as supranational insti-
tutions) in an active way and could be seen as a  ‘ European player ’ 64 in the 
domain of inter-parliamentary cooperation. In comparison with parlia-
ments that are only passively cooperative, they are able to coordinate them-
selves more easily with their counterparts. Europeanisation has affected 
 actively networking parliaments differently. They can be suspicious of giving 
a greater role to the EP 65 or including it in inter-parliamentary cooperation 
beyond the absolute minimum and could ultimately even imagine pursuing 
cooperation among national parliaments outside the EU treaties. 66 
 58  For this analysis,  ‘ minimum requirements ’ means participation in the Inter-parliamentary 
 conference on Economic and Financial Governance. 
 59  Sprungk,  ‘ A New Type of Representative Democracy ? ’ (n 57). 
 60  Rozenberg and Hefftler,  ‘ Introduction ’ (n57) 33. 
 61  ibid. 
 62  Rozenberg and Hefftler,  ‘ Introduction ’ (n 60) 34. 
 63  Sprungk,  ‘ A New Type of Representative Democracy ? ’ (n 59) 551. 
 64  Rozenberg and Hefftler,  ‘ Introduction ’ (n 60) 34. 
 65  T  Winzen ,  C  Roederer-Rynning and  F  Schimmelfennig ,  ‘ Parliamentary Co-evolution :  National 
Parliamentary Reactions to the Empowerment of the European Parliament ’ ( 2015 )  22  Journal of 
European Public Policy  75 . 
 66  For such a scenario, see Kreilinger (n 27) 67. 
282 Valentin Kreilinger
 C.  Examples of Positions of National Parliaments Towards 
Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation 
 In order to illustrate the different positions that national parliaments may have 
on inter-parliamentary cooperation, this sub-section considers in detail the stance 
adopted by the parliaments of Denmark, France, Germany and Lithuania during 
the negotiations on the inter-parliamentary conference for economic and fi nan-
cial governance. The activities and preferences of each parliament are analysed 
and subsequently classifi ed into the categories above. 
 In the negotiations on the conference of Article 13 TSCG, the Danish  Folketing, 
the French Assembl é e Nationale, the German Bundestag and the Lithuanian 
 Seimas have all played important roles and adopted strong and visible positions. 67 
At the same time, the set of these four countries combines different degrees of 
parliamentary strength in EU affairs, big and small, old and new Member States 
and, as of 1 January 2015, three of these countries have the euro as their currency. 
This sub-section seeks to answer what their preferences have been and which roles 
these parliaments follow in their attitudes towards the inter-parliamentary confer-
ence in economic and fi nancial governance. 
 1. Denmark (Folketing) 
 In Denmark, the national parliament is generally seen as the true source of 
 legitimacy (compared to the EP): both its scrutiny system on EU legislation and 
the European affairs committee are very strong. 68 
 The Danish Parliament has had a visible position in the discussions on the new 
inter-parliamentary conference based on Article 13 TSCG. 69 In November 2012 
and in March 2013 the chair of the European affairs committee organised meet-
ings with her counterparts. At their second meeting the chairpersons of European 
affairs committees from 15 Member States gathered in Copenhagen and declared 
their preference for  ‘ establishing a small effective conference focused on substan-
tial issues — to be held in the margins of the biannual COSAC-meetings ’ . 70 This 
could be interpreted as showing the institutional self-interest of European affairs 
committees to keep control over EMU issues and avoid empowering their fellow 
MPs who are most likely to come from budget, fi nance and economic committees 
in the case of the Article 13 TSCG inter-parliamentary conference, but it shows 
above all that the Folketing articulated its preferences and succeeded in building 
a large coalition. 
 67  See Cooper (n 9) and Kreilinger (n 10). 
 68  Winzen, Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfennig,  ‘ Parliamentary Co-evolution ’ (n 65) 9. See, 
generally  T  Raunio and  S  Hix ,  ‘ Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back :  European Integration and Parlia-
mentary Government ’ ( 2000 )  23  West European Politics  142 . 
 69  The TSCG was signed and ratifi ed by Denmark despite its opt-out from the euro. 
 70  Chairpersons of European Affairs Committees, Joint letter to the Speakers ’ Conference 
(2013) available at:  www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/fi les/download/082dbcc53dbcb6ed013e07d2d3
1930a6.do . 
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 Hence the Danish Parliament has been an  actively networking parliament in 
order to pursue its objectives, adopting a reluctant position towards an ambitious 
institutional design of the inter-parliamentary conference. In general, however, 
it is probably best classifi ed as a  passively cooperative parliament due to a lack of 
resources for cooperation, 71 and taking into account its only average participation 
rate in inter-parliamentary conferences. 72 
 2. France (Assembl é e Nationale) 
 The question of the role of the national parliaments in the EU has often been 
discussed in the French Assembl é e Nationale. 73 This  ‘ can  … be understood as a 
consequence of the limited weight of the French Parliament within the domestic 
political system ’ 74 and allows some MPs to discretely articulate criticism about the 
EU. All political forces in France agree that the role of the national parliaments in 
the EU should be strengthened. 
 The French National Assembly was in favour of quickly establishing an inter-
parliamentary conference and proposed following the model for CFSP and CSDP 
with six MPs per national parliament and 16 MEPs that would accompany and 
control the European Semester. 75 The Speakers of Parliaments of the six founding 
Member States 76 endorsed this idea at a meeting in Luxembourg in January 
2013. 77 For euro area matters, the French would even like to establish (within that 
conference) a  ‘ Joint Conference Committee ’ composed of six MPs per national 
parliament from Member States whose currency is the euro and 16 MEPs as full 
members. 
 The Assembl é e Nationale has doubtlessly been an  actively networking parliament 
that has tried to strengthen its own position against the government by exploiting 
the opportunities at the EU level to achieve this. It has had the clear objective to 
establish a strong inter-parliamentary body in order to give national parliaments 
a voice against intergovernmental, but also supranational, EU institutions. The 
positions are, however, far beyond the status-quo of inter-parliamentary coopera-
tion and it has been diffi cult to fi nd allies that share these bold objectives. 
 71  C  Hefftler ,  ‘ Inter-parliamentary Relations in the EU: What Drives National Parliaments ’ Partici-
pation in Cooperation beyond the Domestic Arena ? ’ ( UACES 44th Annual Conference ,  2014 )  10 . 
 72  See Kreilinger (n 10) 5 (reporting data on COSAC). 
 73  See, eg  O  Rozenberg ,  ‘ Debating about Europe at the French National Assembly :  The Failure of the 
Rhetoric of Unanimity ’ in  C  Wiesner ,  T  Turkka and  K  Palonen (eds),  Parliament and Europe Rhetorical 
and Conceptual Studies on their Contemporary Connections ( Baden-Baden ,  Nomos ,  2011 ) . 
 74  V  Kreilinger ,  K  Perepechay and  O  Rozenberg ,  ‘ France ’ in  W  Wessels et al (eds),  Democratic Control 
in the Member States of the European Council and the Euro zone summits Annex 2: In-depth reports on 12 
Member States ( European Parliament ,  2013 ) . 
 75  Assemblé e nationale,  ‘ Rapport d ’ information sur le projet de loi de ratifi cation du Traité sur la 
stabilité , la coordination et la gouvernance au sein de l ’ Union é conomique et moné taire ’ (25 September 
2012). 
 76  Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
 77  National Parliaments,  ‘ Luxembourg Working Paper of 11 January 2013 ’ available at:  www.ipex.
eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/fi les/download/082dbcc53b70d1c2013ccdb9a8692a61.do . 
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 3. Germany (Bundestag) 
 While Germany and its parliament have always been among the most vocal sup-
porters of the EP, 78 the Bundestag and Bundesrat were able to gain signifi cant 
scrutiny powers with the treaty revisions of Maastricht (1993) and Lisbon (2009), 
mostly in reaction to decisions by the German Constitutional Court, which have 
signifi cantly strengthened national scrutiny procedures. 79 
 In the discussions around the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 
TSCG, German MPs presented their ideas, but the Bundestag as a whole did not 
articulate an institutional position. 80 The German Parliament was present at the 
meeting in Luxembourg in January 2013 and thus endorsed the working paper. 
Only at a very late stage, in the run-up to the fi rst meeting of the conference in 
Vilnius in October 2013, the German position was made clear: It would be  ‘ prema-
ture ’ to seek the adoption of Rules of Procedure at that point, but the delegation 
welcomed the idea to discuss the aims and functions of the conference. 81 Although 
there is a strong participation in inter-parliamentary conferences and signifi cant 
resources are available, 82 unlike the French Assembl é Nationale, the German Bun-
destag has not been interested in establishing an inter-parliamentary conference 
on economic affairs quickly and has insisted on limiting the conference to being 
an advisory body. 83 
 As a consequence, the German Parliament was initially, until autumn 2013, an 
 inward-looking parliament , before turning into a  passively cooperative parliament 
which — despite having strong opinions on the subject — did not seek to build 
coalitions. This is rather surprising, because having in mind the pro-European 
stance of the German Parliament and its strong powers, one could have expected it 
to be a strong supporter of inter-parliamentary cooperation in economic and fi nan-
cial governance. But the passive attitude of the German Bundestag may be explained 
in light of the signifi cant domestic powers of oversight in EU and EMU affairs it 
has acquired as a result of recent judgments of the German Constitutional Court. 
 4. Lithuania (Seimas) 
 The Lithuanian Parliament, as parliament of the country holding the rotating 
Council presidency in the second half of 2013, and selected to chair the fi rst 
 meeting of the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial 
Governance taking place in Vilnius in October 2013, was in a special situation. 
 78  See Winzen, Roederer-Rynning and Schimmelfennig (n 65) 12. 
 79  C  Callies and  T  Beichelt ,  Auf dem Weg zum Europ ä isierten Bundestag:  Vom Zuschauer zum Akteur 
( G ü tersloh ,  Bertelsmann Stiftung ,  2013 ) . 
 80  See Deubner (n 10) 48. 
 81  Bundestag,  ‘ Letter by the Head of the German delegation, Norbert Barthle ’ (2013) available at: 
 http://renginiai.lrs.lt/renginiai/EventDocument/0f6147e3-6125-40b9-93d8-edc7c31e085f/Barthle_
Lithuanian%20Presidency_EN_courtesy%20translation.pdf . 
 82  Hefftler,  ‘ Inter-parliamentary Relations ’ (n 71) 13. 
 83  Bundestag,  ‘ Letter by the President, Norbert Lammert ’ (2014) available at:  www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/dossier/fi les/download/082dbcc5452b142001456a262f7335a9.do . 
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 Although the time for preparing the fi rst conference was limited, the Lithuanian 
Parliament prepared a draft of the Rules of Procedure: 
 The Seimas had tentatively scheduled time during the Vilnius conference for the draft 
to be debated and, at the end, adopted. Some parliaments commended the efforts of the 
Seimas in preparing it, and a number of delegations (from Estonia, France, Poland and 
the UK) proposed amendments to the draft, on the presumption that this document 
would provide the basis for the debate in Vilnius. 84 
 But the Bundestag and the EP succeeded in exerting pressure on the Lithuanian 
Parliament to remove the item from the agenda of the conference. The debate 
about how conclusions to be adopted at the end of the conference should be called 
and the way in which the Lithuanian Parliament managed to achieve its goals 
shows that it was able to use the prerogatives of the presidency. 85 
 The Seimas has been  actively networking in its Presidency function, but may 
have underestimated that some parliaments were just not interested in agreeing 
on Rules of Procedure at the fi rst conference. It remains to be seen whether the 
Lithuanian Parliament will be an equally active European player after the semester 
during which it presided over inter-parliamentary cooperation: Even if the 
participation of the Lithuanian Parliament in COSAC is in line with that of other 
national parliaments, 86 it can be assumed that its resources are limited. 
 In summary, national parliaments showed different preferences on the precise 
organisation of the inter-parliamentary conference on economic governance 
foreseen by Article 13 TSCG. Most national parliaments prefer  joint scrutiny to 
 centralised scrutiny , due to their institutional self-interest. They have consciously 
adopted positions and articulated them to their peers. These positions are based on 
broader attitudes towards inter-parliamentary cooperation which can be classifi ed 
according to three different roles ( inward-looking parliaments ,  passively cooperative 
parliaments ,  actively networking parliaments ): The Danish Folketing was  actively 
networking , but might not always be able to pursue this strategy and more often 
acts as a  passively cooperative body; the German Bundestag was  inward-looking , 
but turned into a  passively cooperative parliament; the French Assembl é e Nationale 
was  actively networking ; and, fi nally, the Lithuanian Seimas took the privilege of 
its six-month presidency seriously and was  actively networking during that period 
of time. The resources that are available in a national parliament seem to affect 
the extent of inter-parliamentary activities. Besides that, the motivation of the 
individual MP to participate is a factor that might also play an important role. 87 
Parliamentarians have to juggle between commitments linked to (national) party, 
(local) constituency, the domestic political arena and international activities, like 
inter-parliamentary cooperation. Research has shown that the importance which 
 84  Cooper (n 9) 20. 
 85  See ibid. 
 86  See Kreilinger (n 10) 5. 
 87  See, eg  C  Deubner and  V  Kreilinger ,  The Role and Place of Parliaments in a Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union ( Notre Europe — Jacques Delors Institute ,  2013 ) . 
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individual MPs attribute to the EU for the success of their work has a signifi cant 
effect on their activities to obtain EU-related information. 88 
 Beyond the four national parliaments that were analysed here, a larger study 
gathering more data and covering more parliaments could provide additional 
insights. Many of the national parliaments that were not clearly articulating their 
positions, might in fact be  inward-looking parliaments and constitute a silent 
group of national parliaments that carries the responsibility for the absence of a 
collective position related to inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
 V. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN 
THE AREA OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
 Article 13 TSCG foresaw the creation of an inter-parliamentary conference on 
budgetary policies and other issues covered by that treaty, but diverging prefer-
ences among national parliaments and reluctance from the EP concerning the 
internal organisation of the conference have so far prevented a smooth imple-
mentation of the provision. Deadlock, in particular, has emerged with regard to 
the adoption of the Rules of Procedure. Inter-parliamentary cooperation is not a 
new idea and the model of the CFSP/CSDP inter-parliamentary conference seems 
to be well-suited to the goal of having representatives from all major political 
parties and specialised MPs (like committee chairs) in each delegation. 
 Inter-parliamentary cooperation in economic and fi nancial governance 
faces challenges because the relationship between the two parliamentary levels 
( centralised scrutiny or  joint scrutiny ) has not been clearly defi ned until now: 
 ‘ centralised scrutiny ’ would mean that scrutiny is dominated by the EP, with only 
very limited input by national parliaments; whereas with  ‘ joint scrutiny ’ national 
parliaments and the EP would cooperate more closely. 89 The EP and the other EU 
institutions prefer  centralised scrutiny and many of their contributions in the nego-
tiations on the implementation of Article 13 TSCG show that their objective has 
been to keep the inter-parliamentary conference, as an element of  joint scrutiny , 
weak. Inter-parliamentary cooperation does, however, work more or less well 
in other policy areas: with a  ‘ legal-constitutional status ’ 90 in the cases of the two 
other inter-parliamentary conferences, and without such a status in many ad-hoc 
 inter-parliamentary meetings. 91 The explanation for the current deadlock seems 
to be the same as for the challenges which the inter-parliamentary conference on 
CFSP/CSDP had been facing:  ‘ overlapping authority claims ’ . 92 But in the case of 
 88  A  Wonka ,  B  Rittberger ,  ‘ The Ties that Bind ? Intra-party Information Exchanges of German MPs 
in EU Multi-level Politics ’ ( 2014 )  37  West European Politics  624 . 
 89  Cooper (n 9) 2. 
 90  Cooper (n 9) 23. 
 91  Kreilinger (n 10) 7. 
 92  Herranz-Surrall é s (n 6) 15. 
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CFSP/CSDP the changes had taken place step-by-step over a longer time period 
since the Maastricht Treaty (1993) than in the case of EMU where the real losses 
of sovereignty only took place with  ‘ six-pack ’ , TSCG and  ‘ two-pack ’ (2011 – 2013). 
In CFSP/CSDP establishing an inter-parliamentary conference was debated in the 
2000s; in economic and fi nancial governance in 2013 – 14, only a few months after 
the changes had taken place. 
 This chapter has examined the preferences of the most important actors in the 
negotiations on the inter-parliamentary conference on economic and fi nancial 
governance. Its two most vocal critics see a mixed parliamentary body as  ‘ ineffective 
and illegitimate ’ (EP) or want to reduce it to an  ‘ advisory role ’ (German Bundestag) 
Other national parliaments have been more active in inter-parliamentary coop-
eration and more supportive of the inter-parliamentary conference than the 
German parliament which was for a long time  inward-looking and only became 
 passively cooperative in late 2013. This chapter has also examined preferences and 
attitudes of the parliaments of Denmark, France and Lithuania in detail and classi-
fi ed their roles as alternating between  actively networking and  passively cooperative 
(Danish Folketing and Lithuanian Seimas) and  actively networking (French 
Assembl é e Nationale). Many other national parliaments which did not articulate 
their positions clearly, might be  inward-looking parliaments with little interest in 
inter-parliamentary cooperation. In general, national parliaments prefer joint 
scrutiny to centralised scrutiny dominated by the EP, but have not been able to 
agree on a common position. The current deadlock means that much of the deter-
mination to establish some kind of powerful inter-parliamentary control has been 
lost. Thus one can say that parliaments have, once again, failed to be a collective 
actor at the EU level. 93 
 The EU-related democratic defi cit at the national level which was reduced in the 
1990s when most national parliaments established institutions and mechanisms 
that forced governments to explain their actions and policies at the EU level, 94 
seems to be much bigger in the case of fi scal and economic policy coordination 
than in EU affairs in general. 95 The Euro-crisis and the response to it have put 
national governments at the centre of EU policy making and parliamentary actors 
are standing at the sidelines. Thus it still seems possible that two parliamentary 
levels could work together against their declining infl uence,  ‘ exert countervailing 
power ’ , 96  ‘ discuss ’ matters of common interest and  ‘ control ’ in areas with weak 
parliamentary scrutiny (but not ‘ decide ’ ). The key activity of an inter-parliamentary 
conference lies in its capacity to scrutinise rather than in taking binding  decisions: 
 ‘ European decision-makers should be publicly heard, questioned and even 
 93  Kreilinger (n 10) 17. 
 94  Raunio and Hix,  ‘ Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back ’ (n 68). 
 95  See especially Chalmers (n 4); Dehousse and Boussaguet, R Dehousse and L Boussaguet,  ‘ L ’ impact 
de la crise ’ (n 45); Scharpf,  ‘ Monetary Union ’ (n 45). 
 96  Curtin (n 8) 30. 
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 criticised by the conference. ’ 97 If the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Economic 
and Financial Governance acquired decision-making power, this would signifi -
cantly alter the institutional equilibrium. The 2014 Speakers ’ Conference stated 
that: 
 Although the role, scope and title of the Conference are yet to be defi ned, it is clear at 
this point that the Conference can serve as a useful parliamentary forum to discuss and 
exchange ideas, information, and best practice. Speakers consider that the Conference 
could have its own Rules of Procedure and may adopt non-binding conclusions. 98 
 To sum up, inter-parliamentary control would help reduce the existing weak-
ness in democratic accountability and legitimacy linked to the genuine EMU 
in the making. The question  ‘ What form of government for the EU and the 
Eurozone ? ’ that this volume is asking, also raises the question about parliamentary 
control:  ‘ whenever an issue concerns the currency, taxation or the welfare system, 
 parliament must be brought into the debate in one way or another ’ . 99 National 
parliaments were seen as the  ‘ losers or latecomers ’ 100 on their way to Europe. In the 
case of inter-parliamentary control of the EMU they still have to overcome some 
challenges that were outlined in this chapter and learn  ‘ to fi ght back ’ 101 against the 
executives. 
 
 97  V  Kreilinger and  O  Rozenberg ,  ‘ The Inter-parliamentary Conference on Economic and Financial 
Governance ’ in  House of Lords (ed),  The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union. Written 
Evidence ( 2013 ) , available at:  www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-select/Role%20
of%20national%20parliaments/nat-parl-evidence-volume.pdf , 118. 
 98  Conference of Speakers of European Union Parliaments,  ‘ Presidency Conclusions — Vilnius, 6 – 8 
April 2014 ’ available at:  www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/fi les/download/082dbcc5452b1420014541
dc98d61251.do . 
 99  J  Delors ,  Rethinking the EMU and Making the Greater Europe Positive Again ( Notre Europe —
 Jacques Delors Institute ,  2013 )  4 . 
 100  A  Maurer and  W  Wessels ,  National Parliaments on Their Ways to Europe:  Losers or Latecomers ? 
( Baden-Baden ,  Nomos ,  2001 ) . 
 101  Raunio and Hix (n 68). 
